This post is a continuation of several prior essays:
Genes, Genesis and God: Introduction
Genes, Genesis and God: Natural Genesis
Genes, Genesis and God: Cultural Genesis
Genes, Genesis, and God: Science and Religion in Dialogue
In Genes, Genesis, and God, Holmes Rolston conducts a “study in self-identity” (xiv). Much of his argument for the human exodus from nature rests on a distinction between moral animals (humans) and premoral animals (all the rest). Rolston argues that, since humans are the only moral creatures, their behaviors alone can be described in terms such as 
selfish, just, loving, charitable, and so on. It is a category error to refer to nonhuman animals in such cultural terms, and he focuses much of his attention on refuting the pejorative selfish paradigm, which he argues (and I agree with him) egregiously misrepresents the natural and cultural realms.
At the same time, he claims that when humans behave selfishly, they fall away from the “godly ideal,” back to a state of “beastliness” (300). This appears inconsistent with his belief that animals are premoral, and would seem to demean them. Although, given his strong respect for the goodness of animals and nature, and his concern for not reading culture into the natural world, I am reasonably certain this is not intentional.
However, a descriptor such as beastliness, like the term selfishness, risks reinforcing negative ideas about nature and animals. It sounds as if he is juxtaposing moral humans against immoral nature. The “falling back to beastliness” metaphor also underplays the seriousness of poor human behavior, which is not premoral, but either amoral, or more often, immoral
My other concern in regard to the natural exodus is that it maintains an unhealthy chasm between humans and nature. Again, this is inconsistent with Rolston’s argument that, although not genetically leashed, we are still subject to genetic propensities. That is not an exodus. We have not made a complete break from nature. And of course, there is an ongoing debate in science about where nature stops and culture begins.
Perhaps nature and culture are so entwined that there is no break at all, but rather a symbiosis. Furthermore, the suggestion that our evolutionary ancestors were enslaved by their biological foundations carries negative connotations that are not helpful for building a positive relationship with our bodies or with the world on which we depend for life.
I would add to this that there is a growing challenge from ethologists about the moral nature of nonhuman animals. Rolston recognizes this, but does not believe that they have presented adequate evidence that animals are capable of moral behavior. However, if we reach a point where the evidence is overwhelming that some animals do behave morally, albeit in a less sophisticated way than humans, then Rolston may need to replace the exodus metaphor with one that presents morality on a continuum. Still, even lacking that evidence, I think it is not too soon for him to make the change. There seems no reason to refer to bad human behavior as “animal” when it would be more plausible to simply see such behaviors as part of being human.
On the other hand, if we do come to find that some animals can act morally, it is likely that they can also act immorally.4 There is danger here if we make no distinctions between humans and animals. We will need to interpret morality in light of degrees of sentience, sapience, and sociality, not in rigid categories of moral or immoral with no gradations. Humans are still the most intellectually complex animals on the planet. Higher standards of morality would still apply.
Notes
4 This is not to say that if we find that some animals can act immorally that we should consider them categorically bad. It would be no more fair to make such a judgment against an animal than against a human who lapsed into immoral behavior.
Works cited
Rolston III, Holmes. Genes, Genesis and God. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999.
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2 responses so far ↓
Paul Martin // October 20, 2007 at 11:49 pm |
That was a beastly way of putting it – as you say, obscures the valid concept of premoral.
karin // October 21, 2007 at 8:05 am |
Yes, it does. Plus premoral is not so clear cut either. Cognitive ethologists challenge this notion through arguments for degrees of morality in animals. I mention this later in the post (it’s a long post). In any case, I just don’t like the harsh distinction Rolston makes here between humans and nature. I disagree that there’s been an exodus of humanity from the natural world.