Panentheism: Interrelational Perspectives on God, Part III

In the last couple of posts, I began presenting interrelational views on panentheism, as presented in the book In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being. The present post focuses on the perspective of theologian Ruth Page.

Interrelational Perpectives on God, Part III
In an earlier essay, I introduced the concept of emergent monism in theology. As a reminder, emergent monism is inspired by the evolutionary concept of emergence in which natural systems and organisms spontaneously give rise to higher levels of complexity and novel properties. Theologically speaking, emergence refers to the belief that God is not a static substance but a creative, dynamic presence inextricably intertwined with nature and continually advancing it toward higher states of being.

Page argues that emergent monism as a way of understanding God-world relations is problematic for a couple of reasons. First, she suggests that the argument that evolution reveals a pattern of divine purpose is contrary to the evidence. The overwhelming number of occurrences of “natural evil,” such as mass extinctions, tell against divine providence (224, 227). Likewise, she argues that the Process philosophy notion that God lures creatures toward the good is hard to reconcile with natural relationships such as predator and prey.

Second, she objects to ontological hierarchies which grade the intrinsic value of creatures based on what biologist Charles Birch refers to as “richness of experience.” This view, she argues, is rooted in the mistaken belief that complexity and consciousness are simple goods. (Page quoting Birch, 225).1 On the contrary, says Page. Greater complexity and higher levels of consciousness are at best ambiguous with respect to the inherent value of living beings.

Instead, she emphasizes relational over essentialized ontologies in which God values creatures as they are, embedded in their particular situation without reference to humanity. In Page’s words: “the whole of creation is companioned [my italics] by God, not on the basis of hierarchy, but according to what is proper and necessary to the creature in its circumstances” (229).

Rather than panentheism (all in God) as a way of thinking about God’s relationship with living beings, Page proposes the concept of pansyntheism, or all “with” God (231). This idea, she believes, preserves the separate identities required for participants to actually be in relationship, rather than one party overwhelming the other. It also may help us to appreciate that nonhuman creatures have ways of responding to God that are distinct from humans. Their means of relating to God is appropriate for their own kind. As such, it makes no sense to measure their intrinsic value against the value of human beings.

Works cited
Page, Ruth. Panentheism and Pansyntheism: God in Relation,” in In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World (222-32).

Photo: “Predator and Prey” by Carl Purcell, copyright Carl Purcell, image courtesy of www.art.com